The set of optimal matchings in the assignment matrix allows to define a reflexive and symmetric binary relation on each side of the market, the equal-partner binary relation. The number of equivalence classes of the transitive closure of the equal-partner binary relation determines the dimension of the core of the assignment game. This result provides an easy procedure to determine the dimension of the core directly from the entries of the assignment matrix and shows that the dimension of the core is not as much determined by the number of optimal matchings as by their relative position in the assignment matrix. 
Introduction
The assignment game (Shapley and Shubik, 1972 ) is a cooperative model for a twosided market where side payments are allowed. In this market a product that comes in indivisible units is exchanged for money, and each participant either supplies or demands exactly one unit. The units need not be alike and the same unit may have different values for different participants. From these valuations, a matrix can be written, A = (a ij ) (i,j)∈M ×M , which reflects the profit that can be obtained by each buyer-seller pair if they trade.
Shapley and Shubik prove that the core of the assignment game is nonempty, and has a lattice structure. It is a closed and convex polyhedral whose dimension is typically the cardinality of the short side of the market, but may be less in the presence of degeneracies, that is, special arithmetical relations among the matrix entries a ij .
The aim of our paper is to characterize the dimension of this core only in terms of the assignment matrix. To do that, we must identify the aforementioned arithmetical relations among the matrix entries. In doing so we realize that the dimension decreases by the existence of arithmetical relations not only among the entries of the original assignment matrix but also of a related matrix, its buyer-seller exact representative. The buyer-seller exact representative of a given assignment market is introduced in Núñez and Rafels (2002) as the matrix with the entries as high as possible among those that define an assignment game with the same core. It is then no surprising that in the buyer-seller exact representative the number of optimal matchings might increase. In fact, we will see that the optimal matchings of this buyer-seller exact representative capture all the arithmetical relations that determine the dimension of the core. What is important is that all these relations can also be read from the relative position of the (fewer) optimal matchings of the initial market.
The dimension of the core of an assignment market gives information about how large the core is and, in some sense, how much variate are the possibilities of cooperation in the market. Its parallel in discrete models of matching markets without monetary transfers might be the computation of the number of stable matchings.
In this ordinal setting, it remains an open question to find a formula for the maximum number of stable matchings as a function of the number of agents of each type. Thompson (1981) and Balinski and Gale (1987) answer what they consider the analogous question for the cardinal case. They find an upper bound for the number of extreme core points as a function of the number of agents of each type:
where m is the size of the short side of the market. The dimension of the core is a complementary measure of how large the core is. Of course, when the number of extreme points is maximal, the dimension is also as high as it can be. But we may have a maximal core dimension with less number of extreme core points.
As far as we know, the dimension of the core of an assignment market has not been studied in depth. There is a result in a very particular case which seems to relate this problem to the number of optimal matchings: in Sotomayor (2003) it is proved that if an assignment market has a unique core allocation (a zero-dimensional core) then it must have more than one optimal matching. But we show in this paper that the dimension of the core of the assignment game is not as much related to the number of optimal matchings of the market as to the position of these matchings.
We will argue at the end of the paper that for each possible dimension there is an upper bound for the number of optimal matchings but, quite surprisingly, with only two optimal matchings all intermediate core dimensions can be achieved.
To reach our results, we define an equivalence relation on the set of buyers (and another one on the set of sellers) only depending on the position of the optimal matchings, and prove that the number of equivalence classes determines the dimension of the core. In the context of assignment games, also Solymosi and Raghavan (1994) identify the dimension of some specific sets of payoffs with the number of certain equivalence classes. What validates our procedure is that our equivalence relation does not make use of the space of payoffs, that is the core, but only of the original matrix entries.
In Section 2, the basic concepts regarding the assignment model are recalled. In Section 3, and given an arbitrary assignment matrix, the equal-partner binary relation is defined on each side of the market, by means of the set of optimal matchings. Its transitive closure, which we name the chained equal-partner equivalence relation, is analyzed in depth, since it plays an essential role in the results. When the assignment matrix is doubly dominant diagonal the equal-partner relations are already transitive, as shown in Section 4. The characterization of the dimension of the core in terms of the number of equivalence classes of the chained equal-partner relation is proved in Section 5. The proof of the above result relies on the fact that our equivalence relation defines the same equivalence classes both on the original market and on its buyer-seller exact representative. Section 6 concludes. 
Preliminaries
We write (i, j) ∈ µ as well as j = µ(i) and i = µ −1 (j) . We denote the set of matchings between M and M by M(M, M ) . We say a buyer i ∈ M is not assigned by µ if (i, j) ∈ µ for all j ∈ M (and similarly for sellers).
We say a matching µ ∈ M(M, M ) is optimal for the two-sided market (M, M , A) 
Moreover, the core has a lattice structure with two special extreme points: the buyers-optimal core allocation, (u, v) , where each buyer attains his maximum core payoff, and the sellers-optimal core allocation, (u, v) , where each seller does.
From Demange (1982) and Leonard (1983) we know that the maximum core payoff of any player coincides with his or her marginal contribution:
From (1), once fixed µ ∈ M * A (M, M ) , and taking into account that u i +v µ(i) = a iµ(i) , since (u, v) ∈ C(w A ) , we get that the minimum core payoff of a buyer i who is matched by µ is
while u i = 0 if i is not assigned by µ . Similarly the minimum core payoff of a seller j who is matched by µ is
An assignment game with as many buyers as sellers is such that each agent has a null minimal core payoff if and only if it has dominant diagonal (Solymosi and Raghavan, 2001) , that is to say, given any µ ∈ M *
An agent is said to be active when his or her payoff in the core is not constant, while non-active agents are those with a constant core payoff. Throughout this paper, without loss of generality, we assume that A is square by adding null rows or columns if necessary. Notice that this does not modify the dimension of the core.
Given a set X , a binary relation on X is an ordered pair (X, R) where R ⊆ X × X . For any x, y ∈ X , we denote (x, y) ∈ R by x R y and say that the element x is related to the element y . A binary relation (X, R) is reflexive if for all x ∈ X we have x R x ; it is symmetric if for all x, y ∈ X , x R y implies y R x ; and it is transitive if for all x, y, z ∈ X , x R y and y R z imply x R z . A binary relation on X satisfying the three above properties is named an equivalence relation on X . Any equivalence relation on a set induces a partition of this set by means of its equivalence classes. For all x ∈ X , the class of
There is a standard procedure to associate to any reflexive and symmetric binary relation R on X an equivalence relation. This procedure is known as the transitive closure of R which is denoted byR . For all x, y ∈ X we say xR y if there exist
and k r R y . The transitive closure represents the minimum that we have to add to a reflexive and symmetric relation in order to obtain an equivalence relation. Of course, for any equivalence relation R we haveR = R .
The chained equal-partner equivalence relation
We introduce two related binary relations on each side of the market (M, M , A) .
First, the equal-partner binary relation is defined in such a way that a pair of buyers (or a pair of sellers) are related if they have the same partner by two optimal matchings. The equal-partner relations are reflexive and symmetric but might not be transitive (see matrix A 1 below). We then consider their transitive closures and name them the chained equal-partner equivalence relations. The chained equal-partner equivalence relation is the keystone to determine the dimension of the core of the assignment market (see Theorem 12) . This is the reason why we begin studying its properties. 
Similarly, the chained equal-partner binary relationR A on the set of sellers is the transitive closure of the relation R A on M defined by: for
We name R A and R A the equal-partner relations on M and M respectively.
Assuming that the assignment matrix is square and taking into account that then each optimal matching is a bijection between M and M , reflexiveness of these relations follows easily. These relations are also symmetric by definition, but may fail to be transitive. For this reason, we add to each equal-partner relation those pairs that are connected by a chain of agents on their same side of the market such that each two consecutive agents on the chain have a common partner by some pair of optimal matchings. This completion leads to the equivalence relationsR A andR A .
We denote by I The number of equivalence classes is a relevant information for our purposes.
This number does not depend as much on the number of optimal matchings as on the relative position of these optimal matchings. To argue this point, let us consider the following two assignment markets with four agents on each side: one optimal matching placed on the main diagonal and the other one on the secondary diagonal. For matrix A 1 one optimal matching is also on the main diagonal while the other one is placed just below it and in the up-right corner.
The equal-partner binary relation R A 1 is not transitive: 1R A 1 2 and 2R A 1 3 , but buyer 1 is not related to buyer 3 by R A 1 . However, transitivity holds for the relation
Moreover, despite the fact that both matrices have the same number of optimal matchings, their corresponding chained equal-partner equivalence relations define different sets of equivalence classes. The equivalence relationR A 1 defined on M has only one equivalence class, I
(similarly,R A 1 has only one equivalence class that is J 
Proof: Statement 1) follows from statement 2) and the fact that µ is a bijection.
To prove statement 2), let us take an equivalence class I 
We will first prove that µ(I
and this implies that
. By repeatedly applying the same argument we obtain j 2 , . . . , j k and j also belong to µ(I
As a consequence of this lemma, from now on the equivalence classes will be numbered in such a way that µ(I 
Moreover, from (u, v) ∈ C(w A ) , we also have that u i 0 + v j = a i 0 j and together with equation (5) it follows that u i 0 = u i 0 , which contradicts i 0 being active. The proof of statement 2) is similar and thus left to the reader. 2
In addition to this, any optimal partner of an active agent must also be active The partition in equivalence classes has some consequences on the structure of the core. We see now that the payoffs to two buyers on the same class have a constant difference in all core allocation. A similar statement could be done for the sellers. 
If
and, as a consequence,
Then we can write
and since each of these differences is constant in C(w A ) we obtain that
2) By part 1),
The above lemma shows that the equivalence relationsR A andR A imply some connection between the core payoffs of some agents and thus it is not surprising that these equivalence classes turn out to determine the dimension of the core. In fact, the converse of statement (1) 
. This definition does not depend on the chosen optimal matching µ ∈ M * A (M, M ) . In Núñez and Rafels (2002) it is proved that, for a square assignment game, having doubly dominant diagonal is equivalent to being buyer-seller exact, that is to say, to satisfying that each matrix entry is attained in some core allocation: for all i ∈ M and all j ∈ M there exists (u, v) ∈ C(w A ) such that u i + v j = a ij . Thus, if a square assignment game has doubly dominant diagonal, no matrix entry can be raised without modifying the core of the game. 2 The names of dominant diagonal and doubly dominant diagonal make more sense if the optimal matching is placed on the diagonal of the assignment matrix. But since these two properties of the matrix characterize properties of the core of the game, and the core does not depend on the selected optimal matching, they can be stated in terms of any optimal matching.
We are now interested in some additional properties of the core of an assignment game with doubly dominant diagonal in relation with the defined equivalence classes.
The next technical lemma shows that in a buyer-seller exact assignment game, or an assignment game with doubly dominant diagonal, if one core constraint is tight at all core allocations, then the corresponding mixed-pair coalition must be paired in some optimal matching. In fact, all mixed-pair (i, j) ∈ I A k × J A k belongs to some optimal matching. 
Lemma 6 Let (M ∪ M , w
1. (i, j) ∈ I A k × J A k for some k ∈ {1, 2, . . . , r} . 2. u i + v j = a ij for all (u, v) ∈ C(w A ) .
There exists µ ∈ M *
A (M, M ) such that (i, j) ∈ µ .
(i) belongs to µ(I
A k ) = J A k . As for 1) ⇒ 2) , if (i, j) ∈ I A k × J A k we have that, once fixed µ ∈ M * A (M, M ) , j = µ(i ) for some i ∈ I A k . Then, by Lemma 5, u i + v µ(i ) = u i + v j is constant in C(w A ) . Now, since (M ∪ M , w A ) is buyer-seller exact, u i + v j = a ij for all (u, v) ∈ C(w A ) .
It only remains to prove 2) ⇒ 3) . Assume u
and together with
also constant in C(w A ) , but, since A is buyer-seller exact, we know that there
We can now define a new matching
and prove it is optimal for A , since
Since (i, j) ∈ µ , the proof is finished. 2
A consequence of the above lemma is that, when the assignment game has doubly dominant diagonal, the equal-partner relation R A is already transitive, and there is no need of the transitive closure.
Theorem 7 Let (M ∪ M , w A ) be a square assignment game. If A has doubly dominant diagonal, then the equal-partner binary relation is transitive, that is,R
Proof: Let us see that under the assumption that A is doubly dominant diagonal, if 
To have a doubly dominant diagonal is a sufficient condition for the transitivity of R A , but it is not necessary. Consider the matrix
A:
1' 2' 3' 
Moreover, any matching that is optimal for A is also optimal for A 
The second way to obtain the buyer-seller exact representative A r , which can also be found in the paper cited above, is of a more theoretical nature and only makes use of the matrix entries:
This means that each mixed-pair coalition {i, j} evaluates what it could achieve by cooperating with some optimally matched pairs on the basis that these pairs will be paid what they obtain in the fixed optimal matching, and then takes the maximum between this worth and a ij . Expression (8) will be useful in the proof of Proposition 8.
Since the buyer-seller exact representative A r is doubly dominant diagonal, by Theorem 7 its equal-partner binary relation is already transitive,R A r = R A r . Also, by Lemma 6 it is easy to identify by means of its equivalence classes which core constraints are tight at all core allocations and, as a consequence, the dimension of C(w A r ) . In the next section we see that also the chained equal-partner equivalence relationR A of the initial assignment game determines the dimension of its core.
The dimension of the core
As announced before, the dimension of the core of the assignment market will be determined by the number of equivalence classes of the chained equal-partner relation.
We have seen in the previous section that, for the buyer-seller exact representative 
in terms of the assignment matrix.
which shows that u i 2 + v µ(i 1 ) is also constant for all core allocation of (M ∪ M , w A r ) .
Thus, for all (u, v) ∈ C(w A r ) ,
By (8) it may happen that a r i 2 µ(i 1 ) = a i 2 µ(i 1 ) and then, by substitution in (9) 1 , i 2 }} is also optimal for A and since µ(i 1 ) = µ (i 2 ) we get (kr) . By substitution in (10), and taking into account (9), we get
As a consequence, the matching
is also optimal for A . Now, since µ (i 1 ) = µ(i 2 ) , we get i 1RA i 2 , in contradiction with the assumption.
As a consequence, for all (u, v) ∈ C(w A ) ,
and then,
.
, we obtain that all these core constraints are tight at all core allocations. To unify notation let us write
Then, since i 1 =k 0 and i 2 =k r+1 belong to different equivalence classes by the relationR A , there must be two consecutive buyers in this chain
whose equivalence class byR A differ. Let us say these arek j andk j+1 , for some By the above lemma, for all assignment games with the same core the equivalence relationR A , and consequently the partition in equivalence classes, is the same.
Thus, whenever we want to analyze some core property of these markets in terms of this equivalence relation, we can restrict to their buyer-seller exact representatives.
For this representative, the chained equal-partner relation coincides with the equalpartner relation, which is already transitive. This is shown in the next corollary. 
2.
And similarly for the relationR A on M .
Proof: The implication (1) ⇒ (2) is part (1) of Lemma 5. As for (2) ⇒ (3) , notice Proof: By Proposition 8, we assume without loss of generality that A is buyerseller exact. We will prove first that dim C(w A ) ≤ r . Take any optimal matching µ . For all (u, v) ∈ C(w A ) and all (i, j) ∈ µ we have that 
To prove the converse inequality, take (u, v) in the relative interior of C(w A ) .
Recall that x ∈ Af f (C) belongs to the relative interior of C , ri(C) , if and only if there exists ε > 0 such that B(x, ε) ∩ Af f (C) ⊂ C , where B(x, ε) is the ball centered at x with radius ε > 0 . Recall also that the relative interior of a non-empty convex set is also non-empty. Then, since all assignment game has a non-empty core,
Since we are assuming that A is buyer-seller exact, by Lemma 6 we know that a core constraint u i + v j ≥ a ij is tight at all core allocations if and only if (i, j) ∈
that, you only have to built a m × m matrix with t non-zero diagonal blocks, each diagonal block being a constant and positive matrix and all blocks out of the diagonal being null.
Moreover, it may well happen that a submarket has a core with a dimension that is higher than the dimension of the core of the initial assignment market. The reason is that in general the submarket does not preserve the optimal matchings of the initial market and thus the number of equivalence classes may increase.
We may also ask if there is any relationship between the number of optimal matchings and the dimension of the core. As a first answer we obtain that an assignment market with all agents active is full dimensioned, that is dim C(w A ) = m , if and only if there is only one optimal matching. This happens because, if only one optimal matching exists, then each equivalence class is a singleton. Moreover, if the optimal matching is not unique, then at least two agents will be related by the equalpartner relation, and then the number of equivalence classes will be less than m , since at least one class will contain more than one agent.
As the dimension of the core decreases, its relationship with the number of optimal matchings is not so tight. One could think that as the dimension diminishes, the number of optimal matchings increases. But this is not exactly the case. Thus, there is not a lower bound to the number of optimal matchings depending on the dimension of the core. However, it is true that, as the dimension decreases the upper bound for the number of optimal matchings increases.
To argue this assertion, notice that if the matrix has doubly dominant diagonal, and once assumed that the agents on the same equivalence class are consecutive, all matching contained in the diagonal blocks is optimal. This is to say, all matching µ ∈ M A r (M, M ) such that for all (i, j) ∈ µ there exists k ∈ {1, 2, . . . , r} with only one point, then the optimal matching cannot be unique. The reason is that if the core is zero-dimensional then all the agents on each side of the market belong to the same equivalence class (the one formed by non-active agents), and this cannot be achieved with only one optimal matching.
Finally, from the description of the equivalence classes of the transitive closure of the equal-partner relation we can recognize when the kernel of an assignment game coincides with the core. The kernel is another set-solution concept for coalitional games with transferable utility which was introduced by Davis and Maschler (1965) .
Taking into account that the kernel of an assignment game is included in the core (Driessen, 1998) , we know by Granot and Granot (1992) that the kernel of an assignment game coincides with the core if and only if there does not exist an agent with non-constant payoff in the core that is matched with the same partner in all optimal matching. We can now say that this happens if and only if no equivalence class formed by active agents is a singleton. 
